Just as the Party’s central leadership is gearing up for its
19th National Congress, a new document, which falls right at the top of the
policy hierarchy, has prompted a flurry of excited discussion in the NGO
sector.
The document acts as a guide to major reforms intended for the
institutions currently in place to regulate NGOs and promises to help the
sector develop in a ‘healthy’ way. NGOs, it tells us, will be encouraged to play
a role in dispute mediation and to develop innovative new models of social
governance. When it comes to the provision of public services, the document
lists broad areas where priority will go to NGOs in government procurement. And
they won’t be staying at home either. A section on ‘standardizing the
foreign-related activities of NGOs’ tells us China’s own NGOs will be
encouraged to participate in international non-governmental organizations and
in ‘developing international rules and standards.’ The document covers
everything from the major expansion of community-based NGOs to the delinking of
chambers of commerce from government, and lists the responsibilities of
different government ministries from the Ministry of Finance to the Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Security in helping this vast project in NGO
development happen.
But at the heart of the debate that has filled the WeChat
accounts of NGO experts over the last few days is what this document means for
the autonomy of NGO actors. One thing the document promises is to create, by
2020, a ‘Chinese-style’ NGO regulatory system which will allow for NGOs that
are ‘separate from government,’ in a system where ‘powers and obligations are
clear, and autonomy is practiced in accordance with the law.’ It tells us that
these reforms will help straighten out relations between government, market,
and society. This statement alone, by its very utterance, suggests the enormity
of this document, treating as it does NGOs as a bona fide part of the make-up
of the country. This, in the context of a China where society was almost
entirely subsumed by the government for decades, is cause for optimism.
The document goes into quite some detail as to how most NGOs
will be able to secure status as legal person entities and enjoy preferential
tax policies through procedures that are to be simplified. This breaks down
formidable institutional barriers that had previously prevented NGOs from
gaining legal status. For most NGOs, there will no longer be the need for a
government organ or a government entrusted body to act as ‘supervisory agency,’
which used to be one of the basic criteria for an NGO to achieve legal status.
This will cut down significantly on government meddling in NGO business. The
document also aims to stop officials from taking up positions in or
establishing their own quasi-NGOs, and demands that any official in active
service already holding a concurrent position as an NGO director must resign
from one or the other position within the next six months.
But here’s the most puzzling part: why would the leadership
want to encourage the development of a sector of autonomous NGOs when its
apparent worries about autonomous activism have recently been leading to
crackdowns on groups like civil rights lawyers? The answer to this seems to be
that the Party has by now realized that anything short of a level of
suppression unseen in recent years will not stem the tide of NGO development
and that the best thing to do about this is to make like this development was
the plan all along. This enables the state to enjoy credit for its wise move in
supporting the sector, hence in the opening of this document it claims: ‘since
the beginning of reform and opening, with the significant attention and support
of all levels of Party committees and government, China’s NGOs have been
constantly developing, and have played a positive role in promoting economic
development and helping social causes prosper.’ The development of NGOs can
also help the government to pass the responsibility for all the things it can’t
do properly, like providing quality public services, to someone else. And NGOs
are already, as suggested in the document, beginning to help the state address
the need for a complete overhaul in China’s model of governance.
So is the leadership really encouraging the development of an
enormous army of autonomous NGOs, phasing out Party and government interference
in their operations? Or is it simply moving one form of intervention out and
sticking a different one back in? It seems there may be a little of both.
Certainly genuine measures are already being put in place to build a modern
sector of relatively independent NGOs that can access the resources and build
the capacity to achieve the roles the authorities foresee for them. But the document
also makes clear the intention is to consolidate and expand the foundations of
the CPC’s position as governing party. NGOs with three or more Party members will
continue to be expected to have an internal Party organization, and there is a
whole section within the ten-part document dedicated to ‘strengthening Party
leadership over the work of NGOs.’ It remains to be seen whether in practice this
means NGOs will be playing a much more independent role or whether the Party
will encroach so much on their business that they will simply become new
vehicles for control. The latter is unlikely, although there will continue to
be an element of Party ‘guidance’ in the sector.
But what this document does tell us unequivocally is that the
central leadership is paying close attention to the development of China’s NGO
sector and will continue to do so in the years to come.
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